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Battles for corporate control have increasingly attracted the public
spotlight. This attention reflects not only the growth in the number of
acquisitions in the 1980s but also the size of the targets. Firms previously
thought too large to be takeover targets have been acquired despite ac-
tive management opposition.
Any acquisition, and particularly one involving sizable assets, is
likely to result in disruptions. Employees may be reassigned or laid off,
suppliers may be changed, investment programs may be cut back. The
prospect of such changes may encourage those threatened by acquisi-
tions to form a coalition with current management in supporting such
defensive strategies as restrictive corporate charter amendments, anti-
takeover legislation, and active litigation. These takeover battles and the
resulting increase in public interest in takeovers have led policymakers
and academics to consider whether current takeover procedures appro-
priately balance all the competing interests.
In the fall of 1987 the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston brought to-
gether financial economists, industrial organization specialists, govern-
ment officials and representatives of the business and investment
communities to examine the reasons for the current merger and acquisi-
tion wave, the implications for economic performance, and the appro-
priate public policy responses. At the conference, The Merger Boom,
two views of mergers and acquisitions and two approaches to the study
of mergers were represented.
Financial economists, relying on stock market data and portfolio
models, generally have a positive view of mergers and acquisitions. The
*Vice President and Economist, and Economist, respectively, Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston.Lynn E. Browne and Eric S. Rosengren
increase in acquisitions in the 1980s is seen as part of a necessary restruc-
turing of U.S. corporations leading to greater efficiency and higher pro-
ductivity. The gains from this restructuring are evidenced in the large
increases in the stock prices of acquisition targets when acquisition at-
tempts are announced. New techniques for valuing corporations and
new financing mechanisms have contributed to the rise in acquisitions,
especially hostile takeovers, by subjecting managers to close scrutiny
and by enabling prospective acquirers to attract funds quickly. Restric-
tions on takeovers would prevent efficiency-enhancing restructuring
and should therefore be opposed.
Industrial economists, on the basis of accounting data and models
of market structure, are skeptical of the efficiency gains that their finance
colleagues claim for acquisitions. Acquirers and investors may expect to
realize efficiencies but these expectations are often unrealistic. Accord-
ing to the industrial economists, most acquisitions are unsuccessful in
terms of increasing profitability and market share; transition costs asso-
ciated with the merger tend to reduce hoped-for gains. The industrial
organization economists also suggest that management empire-building
and attempts to acquire market power, rather than efficiency gains, may
motivate many acquisitions. In attempting to explain the recent upsurge
in acquisitions, they emphasize the effects of more liberal antitrust en-
forcement and the reshuffling of assets acquired in the conglomerate
merger boom of the 1960s. The breakup of diversified companies formed
in past merger booms is also seen as confirmation that mergers are not
productive.
The conference brought together representatives of these two dispa-
rate viewpoints in the hope of clarifying the nature of their differences
and identifying areas of agreement. The major conclusions of the confer-
ence were as follows:
® The current merger and acquisition boom has many causes. The pres-
sures of international competition, financial innovations, and more lib-
eral antitrust enforcement, as well as other factors, have all
contributed.
® The current acquisition boom differs from past merger booms, both in
its causes and in the forms of acquisition. While diversification was an
important motive for mergers in the 1960s, the current boom has been
characterized by a large number of "bust-up" takeovers, or takeovers
of diversified companies with the object of selling the component
pieces. The current boom is also unusual in the large size of the acqui-
sition targets and in the prevalence of hostile takeovers, management
buyouts, and debt-financed acquisitions.
® Shareholders of target companies gain from acquisition attempts. The
increases in share prices are at least as large, if not larger, for targets of
hostile takeovers as for acquisitions that have target management’sAN OVERVIEW
support. The source of these gains to target shareholders remained an
open question. The finance economists attributed the gains to efficien-
cies resulting from the acquisitions, but conceded that there may be
alternative explanations. The industrial organization economists ar-
gued that mergers are unproductive and therefore that efficiency gains
cannot be the sources of the returns to target shareholders. Gains to
target stockholders may reflect inflated prices paid by the acquirer,
resulting from unrealistic expectations about potential gains from
mergers.
® Restrictions on hostile takeovers are misguided. The finance econo-
mists were strongly opposed to corporate antitakeover defenses and
state laws restricting hostile takeovers, seeing them as protecting inef-
fective management and preventing desirable restructuring. Industrial
organization economists, while disputing that acquisitions lead to effi-
ciency gains, did not favor takeover restrictions. They were reluctant to
protect incumbent .management or deny target shareholders the large
increases in share prices that takeovers produce.
® More research should be devoted to determining how managerial in-
centives may be used to resolve conflicts between management and
shareholders. Such conflicts are especially acute when a company is a
takeover target, as incumbent management is likely to be displaced.
Conflicts may also arise from the opportunity to make acquisitions, as
compensation packages tied to company size may reward unproduc-
tive empire-building.
® The research techniques of the finance and industrial organization
fields should be brought together. Reconciling the existence of large
gains to target shareholders with the disappointing postmerger perfor-
mance of merging firms requires the data and research approaches of
both fields. Until such reconciliation takes place, finance and industrial
organization economists, despite areas of agreement, will continue to
view mergers and acquisitions very differently.
This article provides an overview of the seven conference papers
and discussants" remarks. Particular emphasis is placed on areas of dif-
ference and agreement that recurred throughout the conference. The
first three papers examined the reasons for the current merger wave.
The fourth and fifth papers addressed the effects of mergers and acquisi-
tions, focusing on whether acquisitions result in efficiency gains. The
final two papers considered public policy implications of the recent in-
crease in acquisitions. A brief conclusion follows the overview.
Motivations of the Current Merger Boom
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and acquisitions? The answer depends, in part, on whether the question
is asked of someone with a finance or an industrial organization per-
spective. The first paper, by David Ravenscraft of the University of
North Carolina, offered an industrial organization perspective.
Expectations and Merger Waves
Ravenscraft introduced themes that recurred throughout the confer-
ence: there are many motivations for mergers and, therefore, many fac-
tors responsible for a merger wave; the current merger wave differs from
past waves in a number of respects, including the increased use of hos-
tile tender offers and the large size of takeover targets. However, Ra-
venscraft’s central points were, first, that merger waves reflect changing
expectations of the gains from mergers and, second, that expectations of
efficiency gains from mergers are likely to be disappointed. Although
the stock market reacts positively to merger announcements, bidding up
the stock prices of target companies, Ravenscraft argued that mergers
and acquisitions do not improve the postmerger performance of combin-
ing firms. A merger wave begins when some combination of circum-
stances convinces investors and potential acquirers that acquisitions will
be more productive than they were in the past. The wave subsides as it
becomes apparent that the expected gains are not materializing.
Most research on earlier merger waves emphasized the importance
of business cycle variables such as low interest rates, which reduce ac-
quisition costs, and high stock prices, which may reflect expectations of
higher earnings. However, the merger wave of the 1980s continued
through two recessions and two expansions, during which interest rates
and stock prices varied greatly. Thus, Ravenscraft argued, the current
wave cannot be explained by fluctuatiohs in cyclical variables. Instead,
he emphasized the effects of less restrictive antitrust enforcement and
the deregulation of certain industries.
Not only have antitrust guidelines become less restrictive in recent
years, but also the government has challenged borderline cases less fre-
quently. Major regulatory changes have occurred in the banking, trans-
portation, communication, and oil and natural gas industries; as a
consequence, firms that were insulated from competition by regulation
are now forced to operate more efficiently. While the relaxation of anti-
trust barriers made possible acquisitions that were previously prohibit-
ed, Ravenscraft thinks that the primary significance of antitrust and
regulatory changes was to cause managers and investors to revise up-
wards their expectations of the gains from acquisitions. In other words, a
changed environment has persuaded potential acquirers and their fi-
nancing sources that acquisition opportunities have improved and that
the mistakes of the past will not be repeated. The merger wave willAN OVERVIEW
continue until these expe.ctations are disappointed.
Discussion: Need for Restructuring
John Paulus, chief economist of Morgan Stanley & Co., took issue
with Ravenscraft’s negative assessment of acquisitions, arguing that
mergers and acquisitions do indeed result in efficiency gains. While
agreeing that mergers have many motivations, Paulus attributes much
of the recent increase in acquisition activity to intensified competitive
pressures, which have created a need for restructuring. These pressures
have arisen in manufacturing because of increased foreign competition
and in mining, banking, and various other industries because of deregu-
lation. Competitive pressures have led to changes in internal operations
as well as to mergers and acquisitions in the affected industries. In con-
trast to Ravenscraft, Paulus believes that expectations of efficiency gains
from acquisitions will be fulfilled. Paulus cited productivity improve-
ments in the industries subject to restructuring as evidence of the benefi-
cial effects of merger and acquisition activity.
Paulus expects the acquisition boom to continue and to extend to
the services industries as the falling dollar redistributes income away
from services and increases competitive pressures in this sector. He pre-
dicted that leveraged buyouts, or acquisitions relying predominantly on
funds raised in the bond market, would figure prominently in future
acquisition activity. Leveraged buyouts frequently alter the way a firm is
managed. Since most of the firm is financed by debt, management’s
immediate objective is to maintain a cash flow that .can pay the .interest
and some of the principal. In leveraged buyouts in which senior man-
agement is an owner or creditor, management has strong incentives to
cut waste and run the firm efficiently.
Discussion: Acquirers" Motivations
Robert Henderson, drawing upon past experience as the chief ex-
ecutive officer of Itek, an acquisition target, agreed with Ravenscraft that
the motivations and expectations of the acquiring management are cen-
tral to understanding mergers. He argued that acquiring management
can always find some hoped-for efficiency gain to justify a merger. How-
ever, the difficulties of combining corporate cultures, as well as the un-
foreseen problems, cause most mergers to be less successful than
expected. Making a merger work is difficult, even when a good fit ap-
pears to exist between the target and the acquirer. The current acquisi-
tion boom, particularly the increase in divestitures and bust-up
takeovers, may be partly an attempt to correct the mistakes made in the
conglomerate merger boom of the 1960s.Lynn E. Browne and Eric S. Rosengren
Financial Innovations and Mergers
Gregg Jarrell, formerly chief economist of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, provided a financial economist’s view of the role
that financial innovations have played in the recent increase in merger
activity. Jarrell attributes the rise in merger and acquisition activity to a
combination of economic trends, changes in industry regulation and
antitrust enforcement, and financial innovations. Of the financial inno-
vations, Jarrell considers the growing importance of institutional inves-
tors to be the most fundamental. Highly sophisticated analysts now
control large pools of mobile capital. As a consequence, managers are
subjected to more intense scrutiny by the capital markets and funds are
transferred rapidly to prospective acquirers who promise more produc-
tive management strategies.
Junk bonds, or bonds below investment grade, are another major
innovation. In diversified portfolios, junk bonds have historically pro-
vided high returns and small losses. These high returns have attracted
investors, such as thrift institutions and pension funds, that previously
avoided securities below investment grade. For borrowers, junk bonds
are attractive because they do not have many covenants and, thus, im-
pose fewer restrictions on the borrower than investment-grade bonds or
bank financing. For smaller borrowers, junk bonds may also be the only
available source of non-equity capital. Associated in the public eye with
hostile takeovers, junk bonds have also become important for friendly
acquisitions and financial restructurings. They have contributed to the
growth in leveraged buyouts, as the high debt burden of such compa-
nies makes financial flexibility vital.
Jarrell also reviewed the relationship between antitakeover regula-
tions and corporate defenses, on the one hand, and financial innova-
tions and takeover offensive tactics, on the other. Restrictions on hostile
takeovers are typically justified on the grounds that they protect the
shareholders of the target company. However, Jarrell has found no em-
pirical support for the view that target shareholders suffer in a takeover.
On the contrary, the target’s stock price rises substantially in a takeover
attempt. If the restrictions lead to an auction, with several bidders com-
peting to acquire the target, the target price may be higher than other-
wise; but if a takeover is thwarted entirely, the share price typically falls
back to its original level. Jarrell expects antitakeover laws to grow in
popularity. While this will make takeovers more costly and time-con-
suming, Jarrell also expects that new financial innovations and takeover
techniques will be developed to circumvent these barriers.
Discussion: Interest Rates and Stock Prices
The discussion centered on whether the merger wave could surviveAN OVERVIEW 7
an economic downturn. Acquisition specialist Frank Haydu, in contrast
to Ravenscraft, argued that macroeconomic conditions, specifically the
decline in interest rates and the rise in stock prices, have helped foster
the merger wave. Haydu, who has organized many leveraged buyouts,
stressed the importance to investors of being able to recycle funds. In-
vestors who take firms private with a leveraged buyout hope to profit by
reselling the firm to the public. How many leveraged buyouts would be
viable if the firms could not be sold back to the public after they had
been turned around? If the economy were to turn down and the stock
market were to decline, many highly leveraged acquisitions would have
trouble making debt payments and their owners would incur substantial
losses if they tried to sell. Jarrell agreed that recent financial innovations
have yet to be tested by a recession, but he emphasized that the junk
bonds used to finance ma~y leveraged buyouts have considerable flexi-
bility, so troubled firms carl restructure their financing rather than enter
into bankruptcy.
Changing Valuation Techniques
Batterymarch fund managers Dean LeBaron and Lawrence Speidell
demonstrated how new valuation techniques have enabled institutional
investors to identify undervalued firms. Their approach, which uses
publicly available data, challenges key premises of the financial econo-
mists, who typically argue that the stock market prices firms efficiently,
so that the stock price reflects the firm’s underlying value based on
publicly available information.
According to LeBaron and Speidell, stock prices in the 1950s and
1960s were set by individual investors relying on research analysts,
while prices in the 1970s were determined by institutional investors
looking at accounting ratios for the corporation as a whole. In the 1980s,
however, LeBaron and Speidell believe that valuations are beginning to
be based on the replacement cost of corporations’ underlying assets. A
few "corporate raiders" were among the first to observe that the replace-
ment value of a firm’s assets may exceed the value placed on the firm as
a whole by the stock market; the raiders exploited these discrepancies
between replacement and market values, financing takeovers of such
companies by selling off the assets. Increasingly, however, current man-
agement is noticing differences between replacement and market values
and is taking steps to increase the market values and close the gaps.
These steps include spinning divisions off as separate companies, repur-
chasing shares in the company, and revealing more information to inves-
tors about undervalued assets. LeBaron and Speidell expect this trend to
continue; accordingly, they have developed a technique for identifying
firms with low ratios of market to replacement values, anticipating that8 Lynn E. Browne and Eric S. Rosengren
these firms will either be restructured by current management or be
taken over. In either case, the market value will increase and early inves-
tors will profit.
The authors show how their "chop shop" technique can be applied
using business segment data. Basically, the market values of diversified
companies are compared with the values of single-line-of-business com-
panies corresponding to the conglomerates’ subsidiaries. In general, di-
versified companies seem to have market values below the sums of the
market values of their appropriately weighted "parts." By way of expla-
nation, LeBaron and Speidell observe that closed-end funds, that is,
mutual funds with a fixed portfolio and limited shares, frequently sell at
a discount from the market value of the portfolio. Similarly, firms for
which it is difficult to disentangle the values of subsidiaries may be
penalized. LeBaron counseled that the manager who wants to fend off
takeover attempts should simplify his operations and provide full infor-
mation on undervalued assets.
Discussion: Feasibility
Joseph Grundfest of the Securities and Exchange Commission
doubted the feasibility of evaluating firms by their replacement values.
Grundfest believes that valuing firms using information on subsidiaries
poses serious methodological difficulties. The accounting problems are
daunting. For example, different firms use different approaches in allo-
cating revenues and costs among their various subsidiaries. The indus-
try definitions upon which the line-of-business data are based are broad,
so that very different companies will be classified in the same industry.
Grundfest also questioned how the replacement value approach cap-
tures the value of intangibles, such as brand names, or takes into ac-
count unique land holdings. He suggested that the appropriate question
was not why the parts are worth more than the sum, but why some
corporate structures had proved more successful than others. Grundfest
agrees with the view that many of today’s bust-up takeovers and divesti-
tures are reactions to past merger mistakes.
In summary, a more competitive environment in deregulated indus-
tries, more liberal antitrust enforcement, the pressures of international
competition, changes in investor attitudes and valuation approaches,
and greater access to takeover financing all played a part in causing the
current merger wave. Financial economists emphasized the pressures
for restructuring, financial innovations, and improved valuation tech-
niques. Industrial organization specialists stressed changes in antitrust
enforcement and deregulation, unrealistic expectations of efficiency
gains, and the correction of mistakes from earlier conglomerate mergers.AN OVERVIEW 9
All agreed that no one factor could adequately explain the merger boom.
Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions
In assessing the effects of mergers and acquisitions, both financial
and industrial organization economists agreed that shareholders in tar-
get companies enjoy substantial gains, as the stock price of a tat’get
typically rises when an acquisition attempt is announced. They differed,
however, in their interpretations of the increase in stock prices.
Free Cash Flow
Michael Jensen of Harvard and the University of Rochester pro-
vided the perspective of the financial economists. The appreciation of
the target’s stock price reflects efficiencies arising from the acquisition.
Gains to target shareholders are not offset by losses to other parties.
Bidder company shareholders do not lose, on balance, and while target
company employees sometimes suffer wage cuts and employment
losses, Jensen attributes these to the competitive pressures giving rise to
takeovers rather than to the takeovers themselves. Efficiency gains may
be due to synergies between the target and the acquiring company or to
the replacement of inefficient target management.
Resolving conflicts between managers and shareholders over the
disposition of free cash flow is one way in which takeovers lead to a
more efficient use of corporate resources. Jensen defines free cash flow
as cash flow in excess of the funds necessary to undertake projects with
positive net present values. Free cash flow develops when a company
has limited growth potential. The oil and gas industry provides an ex-
treme example: price increases in the second half of the 1970s created
large profits but curtailed consumption, creating excess capacity. An effi-
cient allocation of resources requires that free cash flow be paid out to
shareholders. Managers, however, are encouraged to retain this cash
and overinvest in internal projects, because compensation and job secu-
rity are often tied to company size and sales growth. Also, by retaining
free cash flow, managers avoid the scrutiny of the external capital mar-
kets should a need for investment capital arise.
Companies with free cash flow are attractive takeover targets, as the
acquirer can use the target’s free cash flow to finance the takeover. The
target’s debt is increased, based on the expected stream of free cash, and
the proceeds are used to pay the takeover premium to the target share-
holders. In addition, the resulting increase in leverage requires that the
acquiring management operate the firm efficiently and removes man-
agerial control over future free cash. Incumbent management can10 Lynn E. Browne and Eric S. Rosengren
achieve the same result by issuing debt in order to buy back stock or by
arranging a leveraged buyout.
Companies with free cash flow may also be acquirers as well as
acquisition targets. Managers may embark upon acquisition attempts as
a means of disposing of free cash flow. While it would be more efficient if
the free cash flow were paid out to shareholders, these acquisitions may
be less wasteful than investing in unprofitable internal projects.
Jensen expressed concern about the growing number of state laws
restricting hostile takeovers. He attributed these restrictions to the lob-
bying efforts of executives of large companies, who find that size no
longer protects them from takeovers. Although hostile takeovers ac-
count for a small fraction of all acquisitions, ma~iy apparently voluntary
acquisitions would not occur without the implicit threat of a takeover.
Accordingly, Jensen fears that these restrictions will discourage acquisi-
tions generally and lead to a significant reduction in efficiency.
Discussion: Inconsistencies of Free Cash Flow Model
Edward Frydl of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York questioned
the adequacy of the cash flow model as an explanation for mergers. In
particular, the free cash flow explanation does not seem consistent with
merger waves: declining industries with excess cash existed before 1980
as well as after. Also, the free cash flow model requires that managers
behave inconsistently in that they put their own interests ahead of share-
holders’ in retaining cash flow, but in so doing they attract takeover
attempts, which are not in their interest. Frydl expressed concern that
competition among commercial banks and investment banks to finance
risky leveraged buyouts might adversely affect the integrity of the de-
posit base. He also warned that ready access to financing could lead
acquiring managements to take advantage of inside information to the
detriment of shareholders.
Leveraged Buyouts and Management-Shareholder Conflicts
In the ensuing general discussion, several participants voiced con-
cerns about the potential for management-shareholder conflicts in lever-
aged buyout transactions. Leveraged buyouts frequently are organized
by incumbent management, who receive equity in the new organiza-
tion. If the managers, as owners, can achieve efficiencies that enable
them to pay a takeover premium, why were they not already achieving
these same efficiencies? A conflict of interest exists, in that the takeover
price will be lower if management runs the division or company poorly.
Also, managers who are planning a leveraged buyout are unlikely to
search for alternative higher bidders. Thus, incumbent managementAN OVERVIEW 11
may gain at the stockholders’ expense. One advantage of leveraged
buyouts is that, since top management frequently has equity in the new
company, the incentive to operate the firm efficiently is very strong; a
similar financial incentive could be created in firms in which manage-
ment does not have an equity stake by tying management compensation
to stock price performance.
Disappointing Postmerger Performance
Richard Caves of Harvard University challenged the financial
economists’ view that mergers and acquisitions result in more efficient
performance, in the process clarifying the distinctions between the in-
dustrial organization and finance perspectives. Acquisitions are unlikely
to have a favorable effect on the economy as a whole unless they are
productive for the firms directly involved, and Caves finds little evi-
dence that acquisitions are, in fact, productive for the combining firms.
Although target company shareholders dearly gain in acquisitions, bid-
ding company shareholders just break even on average; and since the
bidding company is usually much larger than the target, Caves ques-
tioned whether shareholders experience significant gains overall.
Mergers have the theoretical potential to bring about efficiencies, for
example through the sharing of lumpy multi-use assets or the replace-
ment of inefficient management. However, a review of the industrial
organization literature on postmerger performance indicates that acquir-
ing firms do not experience increases in profitability or productivity and
that the market shares and profitability of acquired units decline. Studies
of British mergers suggest that transition costs wipe out potential gains.
Caves, in recent work with David Barton, found a negative relationship
between technical efficiency and the extent of corporate diversification.
Caves attributes this result to the difficulties of managing disparate lines
of business. He sees this as supporting the argument that acquisitions,
at least diversifying acquisitions, are unproductive.
Given the conflicting evidence of large gains to target company
shareholders, on the one hand, and disappointing postmerger perfor-
mance, on the other, Caves called for more research into the motivations
of acquiring managements. While conflicts between the management
and shareholders of target companies have received considerable public
attention in proposals to restrict golden parachutes and in the general
debate over state antitakeover laws, the conflicts between the manage-
ment and shareholders of acquiring companies have been, in compari-
son, ignored. The large gains to target shareholders may mean simply
that acquiring managements pay too much. Jensen’s theory of free cash
flow applies to acquirers as well as targets, implying that cash-rich com-
panies are likely to engage in unproductive acquisitions. Caves suggest-12 Lynn E. Browne and Eric S. Rosengren
ed that tax policies could be designed to encourage management to pay
out free cash flow to their shareholders. Despite his negative view of
mergers, Caves observed in his presentation that he does not favor anti-
takeover laws and other measures that would protect incumbent man-
agement from displacement.
Discussion: Future Research
In response to Caves’s questioning whether the combined apprecia-
tion in target and bidder market values is positive, Michael Bradley, a
financial economist, cited recent work by Desai, Kim, and Bradley show-
ing a statistically significant positive gain overall. Both the target share-
holders’ share of the total and the dollar value of the overall gain have
increased over time. Bradley urged combining the research approaches
of the financial and industrial organization economists to determine the
sources of these gains. Does the stock market, in responding to acquisi-
tion announcements, accurately distinguish between successful and un-
successful post-acquisition performance? Bradley cautioned, however,
that the postmerger performance of the acquiring firm cannot be the
only standard by which an acquisition’s success is measured; one must
also take into account the gains to target shareholders.
Bradley agreed that bidder motivations are a subject worthy of
study but doubted that overoptimism or hubris could be a general expla-
nation for mergers, as shareholders can prevent such unproductive
empire-building by enacting charter amendments restricting acquisi-
tions or by changing management compensation practices. Changing
management compensation practices would help resolve management-
shareholder conflicts in both bidders and targets: if compensation were
related to a firm’s market value, management would be less inclined to
engage in unproductive acquisitions or to oppose takeover offers that
carried large premiums over the current stock price.
Implications for Public Policy
The final two papers considered some of the public policy implica-
tions of the merger boom. William James Adams of the University of
Michigan focused on the implications for competition, a traditional con-
cern of industrial organization economists.
Mergers and Competition
Less restrictive antitrust enforcement was generally seen as one of
the more important factors contributing to the merger boom. AdamsAN OVERVIEW                                                                  13
took issue with key premises underlying this liberalization. Specifically,
he disagrees with the view, associated with Robert Bork, that anti-
competitive results arise only from horizontal mergers and then only
from mergers in markets with high degrees of concentration. Adams
contends that horizontal mergers can lead to increased market power
and higher prices even in relatively unconcentrated markets. As evi-
dence, he cited a recent study of the airline industry indicating that
increases in market share are associated with higher fares; the effect on
fares is most pronounced when market share is low. Adams attributed
this result to barriers to new competition not captured by the concentra-
tion statistics, for example frequent flyer programs and computerized
reservation systems that tie passengers to carriers serving multiple loca-
tions. Because of these barriers to entry, mergers in the airline industry
could lead to higher prices, even though the resulting market shares
would not violate antitrust guidelines. Adams concludes that concentra-
tion, alone, is a poor proxy for market power; antitrust policy should
take into account the barriers to entry and other sources of market power
in the individual markets and industries in which mergers occur.
Vertical and conglomerate mergers should also be subject to closer
scrutiny, according to Adams. Although vertical and conglomerate
mergers do not result in higher levels of concentration in a market, they
may have anti-competitive effects. In particular, when firms compete in
a number of different markets, the frequency of contacts and resulting
familiarity facilitate collusion and may discourage aggressive competi-
tion. A cooperative pricing strategy developed in one market may be
applied in other markets where the same firms compete. More generally,
information about the behavior of competitors gained from contacts in
other markets may enable an oligopolistic firm to predict more accurate-
ly how these rivals will react and thus may facilitate cooperative pricing.
Vertical and conglomerate mergers may increase the number of points of
contact among firms and, therefore, the opportunities for collusion.
Adams believes that an examination of European merger policy,
particularly as regards joint ventures and mergers of failing firms, would
be very informative. While the case-by-case approach of some European
countries has proved cumbersome, lessons from the European experi-
ence may assist in "fine-tuning" U.S. antitrust policy.
Discussion: Current Antitrust Environment
In response, Robert Crandall of The Brookings Institution argued
that the current economic environment does not support a more restric-
tive antitrust policy. Neither the merger wave of the 1960s nor the cur-
rent merger wave has increased concentration. Even in industries in
which mergers have reduced the number of U.S. competitors, competi-14 Lynn E. Browne and Eric S. Rosengren
tion from overseas producers has prevented U.S. firms from exercising
market power. Moreover, the correlation between concentration and
profits is far from clear-cut. Crandall conceded that there is some evi-
dence that firms competing .in multiple markets are not as aggressive
competitors as firms competing in single markets, but the evidence is
not sufficient to warrant a change in antitrust policies.
Restricting Hostile Takeovers
The regulatory response to the current merger wave has focused on
restricting the small fraction of acquisitions that are hostile tender offers.
Lynn Browne and Eric Rosengren of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
considered whether regulation should treat acquisition attempts that are
opposed by target management differently from those that have man-
agement’s support. Confirming the observations of earlier paper-givers,
they found that target company shareholders fare as well in hostile take-
overs as in other acquisitions. Indeed, stock prices rise somewhat more
in response to the announcement of a hostile tender offer than to the
announcement of a merger or an attempt to take the company private.
Thus, if the welfare of target company shareholders is the primary con-
cern of regulators, the emphasis on hostile tender offers is misplaced.
Browne and Rosengren also examined the performance of hostile
takeover targets along a number of dimensions. One might expect hos-
tile takeover targets to be relatively inefficient in terms of their profitabil-
ity or capital structures, since acquisitions in which the motivation is the
replacement of inefficient management would presumably engender
more opposition than acquisitions based on synergies between target
and bidder. However, Browne and Rosengren found that targets of hos-
tile takeovers are not very different from targets of friendlier acquisition
proposals and probably not very different from companies generally.
Thus, if the replacement of ineffective management is the motivation for
hostile takeovers, the nature of the management failure is not obvious.
Such a result casts doubt on the argument that takeovers promote effi-
ciency by exerting a useful discipline on managers in general. At the
same time, the similarity between takeover targets and other firms pro-
vides no basis for protecting takeover targets and their managements
from changes in control.
Discussion: Changing Managerial Incentives
John Coffee of the Columbia University Law School expanded upon
the theme running through both the Browne and Rosengren paper and
the conference as a whole--target shareholders gain from acquisitions
but the sources of these gains are unclear. Coffee suggested several pos-AN OVERVIEW 15
sible sources of the gains to shareholders, including transfers from man-
agers, employees, and other "stakeholders" in the target corporation, as
well as efficiency gains from restructuring diversified corporations and
curtailing managerial empire-building.
Regardless of their source, if shareholders were to share their gains
with target management, they could secure management’s acquiescence
to takeovers. Without such a sharing of takeover gains, Coffee expects
state antitakeover laws and corporate defense tactics to prove substan-
tial impediments to takeovers. A number of conference participants ob-
jected to Coffee’s specific proposal that senior management receive a
percentage of the takeover premium paid to shareholders, arguing that
this would create perverse incentives. However, they supported the ob-
jective of changing management compensation practices so as to reduce
conflicts between management and shareholders.
Conclusions
The conference brought together representatives of the finance and
industrial organization fields to explore the causes and implications of
the current merger boom. Financial economists found substantial bene-
fits in the current increase in acquisition activity, which was seen as part
of a major restructuring of U.S. business. Competitive pressures are
forcing U.S. corporations to become more efficient. In response to these
pressures, firms are changing their internal operations. They are also
divesting themselves of divisions that do not fit their current business
strategies and they are acquiring firms that will enhance their competi-
tiveness and that they can operate more efficiently than present manage-
ment. Evidence of the benefits from mergers and acquisitions is found in
the large increases in the stock prices of target companies when acquisi-
tion proposals are announced. Those holding this view strongly oppose
attempts to restrict hostile takeovers.
Most industrial organization economists took a much dimmer view
of mergers and acquisitions. Looking at postmerger sales and profit per-
formance they concluded that most mergers are unsuccessful. The in-
crease in mergers and acquisitions, according to this view, reflects
excessive optimism and empire-building on the part of acquiring man-
agements, the breaking up of unsuccessful conglomerates formed in
previous merger booms, and attempts to take advantage of more liberal-
ized antitrust enforcement. Although some concern was expressed
about the negative consequences of mergers for consumer welfare, the
industrial organization economists, while skeptical of the benefits from
mergers and acquisitions, were reluctant to restrict takeovers.
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substantially, there was agreement in several areas. The suggestion that
the research methodologies of financial economists be combined with
those of industrial organization specialists was favorably received. By
comparing the stock market’s response to acquisitions, as shown by
event studies, with postmerger accounting and market structure results,
it may be possible to reconcile the existence of large shareholder gains
with disappointing postmerger performance.
Management compensation packages were seen as a fruitful area of
study, with changes in management incentives having the potential for
resolving management-shareholder conflicts. Such conflicts may arise
both in takeover targets and in acquiring firms. It was suggested that tax
policy be altered to encourage the adoption of management compensa-
tion packages based on stock performance.
The conferees also agreed that the regulatory response to the cur-
rent merger wave, state laws that limit hostile takeovers but do not affect
acquisitions supported by target management, is misguided. Restric-
tions on hostile takeovers will not eliminate the disruptions to employ-
ees and communities or the increases in market power that sometimes
result from mergers, while they may preclude acquisitions that would
revitalize management and lead to productivity gains. Such restrictions
certainly do not achieve their stated purpose of protecting target com-
pany shareholders. Both industrial organization and financial econo-
mists agreed that the shareholders of target companies benefit in
takeover attempts, sometimes more in an unfriendly takeover than in
friendly mergers or management buyouts. What the conferees did not
resolve is whether mergers and acquisitions benefit the economy as a
whole.